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Landauer’s principle, often regarded as the basic principle of the thermodynamics of information
processing, holds that any logically irreversible manipulation of information, such as the erasure of
a bit or the merging of two computation paths, must be accompanied by a corresponding entropy
increase in non- information-bearing degrees of freedom of the information processing apparatus or
its environment. Conversely, it is generally accepted that any logically reversible transformation
of information can in principle be accomplished by an appropriate physical mechanism operating
in a thermodynamically reversible fashion. These notions have sometimes been criticized either as
being false, or as being trivial and obvious, and therefore unhelpful for purposes such as explaining
why Maxwell’s Demon cannot violate the Second Law of thermodynamics. Here I attempt to refute
some of the arguments against Landauer’s principle, while arguing that although in a sense it is
indeed a straightforward consequence or restatement of the Second Law, it still has considerable
pedagogic and explanatory power, especially in the context of other influential ideas in 19’th and
20’th century physics. Similar arguments have been given by Jeffrey Bub [1]
Landauer’s Principle
In his classic 1961 paper [2], Rolf Landauer attempted
to apply thermodynamic reasoning to digital computers.
Paralleling the fruitful distinction in statistical physics
between macroscopic and microscopic degrees of free-
dom, he noted that some of a computer’s degrees of
freedom are used to encode the logical state of the com-
putation, and these ”information bearing” degrees of
freedom (IBDF) are by design sufficiently robust that,
within limits, the computer’s logical (i.e. digital) state
evolves deterministically as a function of its initial value,
regardless of small fluctuations or variations in the en-
vironment or in the computer’s other non-information-
bearing degrees of freedom (NIBDF). While a computer
as a whole (including its power supply and other parts
of its environment), may be viewed as a closed system
obeying reversible laws of motion (Hamiltonian or, more
properly for a quantum system, unitary dynamics), Lan-
dauer noted that the logical state often evolves irre-
versibly, with two or more distinct logical states having
a single logical successor. Therefore, because Hamilto-
nian/unitary dynamics conserves (fine-grained) entropy,
the entropy decrease of the IBDF during a logically irre-
versible operation must be compensated by an equal or
greater entropy increase in the NIBDF and environment.
This is Landauer’s principle. Typically the entropy in-
crease takes the form of energy imported into the com-
puter, converted to heat, and dissipated into the environ-
ment, but it need not, since entropy can be exported in
other ways, for example by randomizing configurational
degrees of freedom in the environment.
Landauer’s principle appears straightforward, but
there is some subtlety in understanding when it leads to
thermodynamic irreversibility. If a logically irreversible
operation like erasure is applied to random data, the op-
eration still may be thermodynamically reversible, be-
cause it represents a reversible transfer of entropy from
the data to the environment, rather like the reversible
transfer of entropy to the environment when a gas is
compressed isothermally. But if, as is more usual in
computing, the logically irreversible operation is applied
to known data, the operation is thermodynamically ir-
reversible, because the environmental entropy increase
not compensated by any decrease of entropy of the data.
This wasteful situation, in which an operation that could
have reduced the data’s entropy is applied to data whose
entropy is already zero, is analogous to the irreversibil-
ity that occurs when a gas is allowed to expand freely,
without doing any work, then isothermally compressed
back to its original volume. Fortunately, these waste-
ful operations can be entirely avoided: it is possible to
reprogram any deterministic computation as a sequence
of logically reversible steps, provided the computation
is allowed to save a copy of its input. The logically re-
versible version of the computation, which need not use
much more time or memory than the original irreversible
computation it simulates, can then, at least in principle,
be performed in a thermodynamically reversible fashion
on appropriate hardware.
Objections to Landauer’s Principle
One of the main objections to Landauer’s principle,
and in my opinion the one of greatest merit, is that raised
by Earman and Norton [3], who argue that since it is not
independent of the Second Law, it is either unnecessary
or insufficient as an exorcism of Maxwell’s demon. I will
discuss this objection further in the third section.
Others have argued that Landauer’s principle is actu-
ally false or meaningless. These objections are of three
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kinds:
1. It is false or meaningless because there is no con-
nection between thermodynamic quantities like
heat and work and mathematical properties like
logical reversibility, so that comparing the two is
comparing apples and oranges;
2. It (or more precisely its converse) is false because
all data processing operations, whether logically
reversible or not, require the dissipation of at
least kT ln 2 of energy—and indeed usually much
more—to be accomplished by any actual physical
apparatus; or
3. It is false because even logically irreversible opera-
tions can in principle be accomplished without an
entropy increase in the environment.
The first objection touches deep questions of the re-
lation between mind and matter which are not entirely
in the province of science, although physicists have long
felt a need to address them to some extent. From its
beginning, the history of the Maxwell’s Demon problem
has involved discussions of the role of the Demon’s in-
telligence, and indeed of how and whether one ought
to characterize an ”intelligent being” physically. On this
question I will take the usual approach of physicists, and
banish questions about intelligence by substituting an
automatically functioning mechanism whenever an in-
telligent being is required. Not only is this mechanism
supposed to be automatic, it ought to obey accepted
physical laws. In particular, the entire universe, includ-
ing the Demon, should obey Hamiltonian or unitary dy-
namics, when regarded as a closed autonomous system.
From this viewpoint the first objection loses much of its
persuasiveness, since there appears to be no deep con-
ceptual problem in inquiring whether an automatically
functioning apparatus designed to process information,
ie a computer, can function in a thermodynamically re-
versible fashion, and if not, how the thermodynamic cost
of operating the apparatus depends on the mathematical
properties of the computation it is doing.
The second objection, that even logically reversible
data-processing operations cannot be accomplished in
a thermodynamically reversible fashion, I believe has
largely been overcome by explicit models, proposed
by myself and others, of physical mechanisms, which
obey the accepted conventions of thermodynamic or me-
chanical thought experiments, and which accomplish
reversible computation at zero cost (so-called ballis-
tic computers, such as the Fredkin-Toffoli hard sphere
model [4]), or at a per-step cost tending to zero in the
limit of slow operation (so-called Brownian computers,
discussed at length in the review article [5]). These ques-
tions were revisited and vigorously debated in an ex-
change in Phys. Rev. Lett. [6], to which the reader
is referred. Of course in practice almost all data pro-
cessing is done on macroscopic apparatus, dissipating
macroscopic amounts of energy far in excess of what
would be required by Landauer’s principle. Neverthe-
less, some stages of biomolecular information processing,
such as transcription of DNA to RNA, appear to be ac-
complished by chemical reactions that are reversible not
only in principle but in practice.
Among the most important logically reversible opera-
tions are copying unknown data onto a blank (ie initially
zero) register, and the reverse process, namely erasure
of one of two copies of data known to be identical. To
show that these operations are logically reversible, we
write them in standard programming notation, where y
represents the register to be changed and x a reference
register which is either added to it or subtracted from it:
y := y + x
y := y - x
The first operation copies the value of x into y, if y is
initially zero; the second erases y to zero, if y and x
are known to be initially equal. For any initial values
of x and y the two operations are logically reversible,
since each exactly undoes the effect of the other. Physi-
cally reversible means of performing these and other log-
ically reversible operations are discussed in [2], [5]. An
important example of a logically reversible operation,
in the context of Maxwell’s demon and Szilard’s engine
(cf. Fig. 12 in [5]), is reversible measurement, in particu-
lar the reversible transition of a memory element from a
standard initial state S into one of two states, call them L
and R, depending on whether the single molecule in Szi-
lard’s engine is located on the left or right. The physical
reversibility of this operation in terms of phase space vol-
umes is illustrated in Fig. 12 of [5]; an explicit clockwork
mechanism for carrying out this reversible measurement
is analyzed in [7].
For the remainder of this section I will focus on the
third objection, the argument that even logically irre-
versible operations can be accomplished without an en-
tropy increase in the environment. This position has
been asserted in various forms by Earman and Norton [8]
and by Shenker [9], not as an argument against the sec-
ond law, but rather as an argument against the thesis of
reversible measurement.
In the context of a modified Szilard engine, similar
to figure 12 of [5], Earman and Norton consider a de-
mon with memory capable of two states, L and R, which
follows a program of steps similar to a computer pro-
gram, executing one of two separate logically reversible
subprograms, “program-L” and “program-R”, depend-
ing on whether the molecule is found on the left or right
side of the partition. Initially, they assume the mem-
ory is in state L (their state L does double duty as the
standard initial memory state, called S in [5] and as the
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left post-measurement state, called L in [5]). Instruc-
tions are labelled below according to the part of the de-
mon’s cycle. Steps M1-M4 comprise the measurement
segment, R1-R5 the “right” subroutine, and L1-L4 the
“left” subroutine. The memory state at the end of the
each operation is shown in brackets.
M1. Insert partition [L]
M2. Observe the particle’s chamber[L] or [R]
M3. If memory bit =R, go to R1 [R]
M4. If memory bit = L, go to L1 [L]
R1. Attach pulleys so right chamber
can expand [R]
R2. Expand,doing isothermal work W [R]
R3. Remove pulleys [R]
R4. Transform known memory bit from R to L [L]
R5. Go to M1 [L]
L1. Attach pulleys so left chamber
can expand [L]
L2. Expand,doing isothermal work W [L]
L3. Remove pulleys [L]
L4. Go to M1 [L]
According to the thesis of reversible measurement,
which Earman and Norton dispute, step M2 can be ac-
complished reversibly, without any entropy increase in
the environment. Temporarily granting this assumption,
Earman and Norton argue that at the culmination of
step R4 or L3, both the gas and demon are back in their
initial states. Work W has been done by removing en-
ergy heat from the reservoir without any other change
in the universe. If all this were really so the second law
would have been violated.
I would argue on the contrary that while each of the
routines L and R by itself is logically reversible, the com-
bination is not logically reversible, because it includes a
merging in the flow of control, which is just as much
a case of logical irreversibility as the explicit erasure
of data. The instruction M1 has two predecessors (L4
and R5). Therefore, when executing this program, there
is a two to one mapping of the logical state as control
passes from L4 or R5 to M1. This is where the work
extracted by the demon must be paid back, according to
Landauer’s principle. There is then no need to seek an
additional entropy increase elsewhere in the cycle, such
as in the measurement step M2, whose reversibility has
in any case been demonstrated for explicit models ( [5]
[7]).
The fact that a merging of the flow of control con-
stitutes logical irreversibility is also illustrated in fig. 1
of ref. [5], where the final Turing machine configuration
has two predecessors not because of an explicit erasure of
data, but because the head could have arrived at its final
location by two different shifts, one of which corresponds
to the intended computation path, while the other corre-
sponds to an allowed transition to the final state from an
extraneous predecessor configuration which is not part of
the intended computation.
A similar objection to Landauer’s principle, this time
illustrated with an explicit gear mechanism involving a
pinion operating between two rigidly connected but op-
posing half-racks, is presented by Shenker [9] in her figure
5, which is adapted from a diagram of Popper (see [10],
chapter 1, Fig. 12). The accompanying text argues that
a single external manipulation, namely a counterclock-
wise rotation applied to pinion gear B, would restore
a memory element called the ”key” from either of two
initial positions labelled respectively ”R” and ”L”, to a
neutral final position labelled ”?”, corresponding to the
standard state ”S” in [7].
While it is indeed true that the counterclockwise ro-
tation of the pinion would do this, the act of performing
that rotation is not thermodynamically reversible, as one
can see by considering in more detail the possible mo-
tions of and mutual constraints between the two relevant
mechanical degrees of freedom, namely 1) the rotation
angle of the pinion and 2) the lateral (left-right) displace-
ment of the key with its two rigidly attached half-racks,
termed “grooves for gear B” in the figure. For any ro-
tation angle of the pinion, there will be a finite range of
backlash within which the key can rattle back and forth
before being stopped by collision with the gear teeth
on the pinion (to demand zero backlash would entail an
infinite negative configurational entropy; the argument
given here in support of Landauer’s principle is indepen-
dent of the amount of backlash, requiring only that it be
nonzero). Consider the resetting action when the key is
initially in the “L” position. The accompanying figure
shows schematically how the range of motion of the in-
formation bearing coordinate (in this case the left/right
displacement of the key) varies as a function of a con-
trolling coordinate (in this case the rotation angle of the
pinion B) whose steady increase brings about a merger
of two logically distinct paths of the information process-
ing apparatus (in this case the resetting of the key to the
neutral position). At stage 1, the information bearing
FIG. 1. Merging of two computation paths.
coordinate is confined to one of the two about-to-be-
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merged paths. At stage 2, the barrier separating these
paths disappears, and the information bearing coordi-
nate suddenly gains access to twice as large a range as
it had before. This is an irreversible entropy increase of
k ln 2 analogous to the Nk ln 2 entropy increase when an
ideal gas of N atoms leaks by free expansion into twice
its original volume, without doing any work. At stage 3,
the controlling coordinate (pinion) does work on the in-
formation bearing coordinate (key), eventually, by stage
4, compressing it back to its original range of motion.
Although Landauer’s principle appears simple to the
point of triviality, there is, as noted in the first section, a
somewhat subtle distinction in how it applies depending
on the nature of the initial state. As noted in [5], fig. 16,
a logically irreversible operation, such as the erasure of a
bit or the merging of two paths, may be thermodynam-
ically reversible or not depending on the data to which
it is applied. If it is applied to random data—a bit that
is initially equiprobably distributed between 0 and 1, or
a key that is equiprobably on the R or the L path in the
accompanying figure, it is thermodynamically reversible,
because it increases decreases the entropy of the data
while increasing the entropy of the environment by the
same amount. In terms of usual thermodynamic thought
experiments, it is analogous to isothermal compression,
which decreases the entropy of a gas while increasing the
entropy of the environment. This situation arises in the
application of Landauer’s principle to Szilard’s engine:
the data being erased (R or L) is random; therefore its
erasure represents a reversible entropy transfer to the
environment, compensating an earlier entropy transfer
from the environment during the isothermal expansion
phase, and making the total work yield of the cycle zero,
in obedience to the Second Law. However, as Landauer
and Shenker note, the data in the course of the usual
deterministic digital computation is not random, but on
the contrary determined by the computer’s initial state.
Thus, at least in the context of knowledge of the initial
state, whenever a logically irreversible step occurs in the
course of a deterministic computation, one of the prede-
cessors is certain to have been on the computation path,
while the other(s) have zero chance of having been on the
path. Shenker argues (her figure 3) that the 1:1 sequence
of states actually visited in the course of a determinis-
tic computation means that deterministic computers are
not bound by Landauer’s principle. In fact, by the above
argument, the performance of a 1:1 state mapping by
a manipulation that could have performed a 2:1 map-
ping is thermodynamically irreversible, the irreversibil-
ity being associated with the wasteful instant (stage 2 in
the above figure) at which a constrained degree of free-
dom is allowed to escape from its constraint without any
work being exacted in exchange. In fact, the significance
of Shenker’s and Landauer’s observation (viz. that the
states actually visited in a deterministic computation
comprise an unbranched chain) is somewhat different.
It means that it is always possible to globally repro-
gram any computation that saves a copy of its input
as a sequence of logically reversible steps, and therefore
to perform it in a thermodynamically reversible fashion,
even though the original computation, before this re-
programming, would not have been thermodynamically
reversible. The earliest example of reversible program-
ming by Lecerf [11] did not attract much attention, per-
haps because it treated reversibility as a purely math-
ematical property without considering its physical im-
plementation or significance. Physical models which can
execute reversibly programmed computations in a ther-
modynamically reversible fashion are discussed in [12],
[4] and [5]. Efficient reversible programming techniques,
and the space/time tradeoff for reversible simulation of
irreversible computations, have received much study [13].
Another critic of Landauer’s principle, Thomas
Schneider [14], argues that the energy cost of biologi-
cal information processing ought not to be regarded as
coming from resetting or erasure, but rather from a two
step process in which a molecular computing system is
first “primed” or activated by the addition of energy,
and later dissipates this energy by falling into one of
several final states. I would argue on the one hand this
is not inconsistent with Landauer’s principle, and on the
other hand that not all biochemical information process-
ing systems are best viewed in this way; for example
the transcription from DNA to RNA, after strand ini-
tiation, can be viewed as a logically reversible copying
process driven chiefly not by prior activation of the re-
actant, but by removal of one of the reaction products,
pyrophosphate.
Landauer’s principle applies in different ways to the
several kinds of physical system capable of reversible
computation or molecular scale thermodynamic engines.
Such devices are broadly of three types:
• Ballistic computers: conservative dynamical sys-
tems like Fredkin’s billiard ball computer, which
follows a mechanical trajectory isomorphic to the
desired computation. Such systems are incapable
of merging of trajectories, so they can only be pro-
grammed to do logically reversible computations,
and indeed do so at constant velocity without dissi-
pating any energy. These devices must be isolated
from external heat baths or noise sources, so they
are not directly relevant to the Maxwell’s demon
problem.
• Externally clocked Brownian machines, in which
a control parameter is quasistatically varied by a
macroscopic external agency to drive the system
through its sequence or cycle of operations. All
other coordinates are free to move randomly and
equilibrate themselves within the constraint set by
the value of the control parameter, and are typi-
cally coupled to a thermal bath. Many realizations
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of Szilard’s engine, including those discussed by
Earman and Norton, and that depicted in Fig. 1
of the present paper, are of this type, as are most
of the proposed realizations of quantum comput-
ers. The thermodynamic cost of operating such a
machine is the work done by the external agency,
integrated over the cycle or sequence of opera-
tions. Mergings of trajectories are possible, but are
thermodynamically costly if applied to nonrandom
data, by the arguments given above. If such merg-
ings are avoided through reversible programming,
these devices operate reversibly in the usual sense
of thermodynamic thought experiments, ie their
dissipation per step is proportional to the driving
force, tending to zero in the limit of zero speed of
operation.
• Fully Brownian machines, in which all coordinates
are allowed to drift freely, within the constraints
they mutually exert on one other. This kind of
machine is like an externally clocked Brownian ma-
chine where the external agency has “let go of the
handle”, and attached a weak spring, so the con-
trol coordinate can drift randomly forward or back-
ward. Examples include Gabor’s engine [16], Feyn-
man’s classic ratchet and pawl [17], Bennett’s en-
zymatic and clockwork computers ( [5], figs. 6-9),
and enzymes such as RNA polymerase and polynu-
cleotide phosphorylase. The thermodynamic cost
of operating this type of machine is determined
by the weakest spring sufficient to achieve a net
positive drift velocity. Because this type of device
can drift backward and explore the tree of logical
predecessors of states on its intended computation
path, a small amount of merging is less costly than
it would be for an externally clocked Brownian de-
vice; as described in more detail in ( [5], fig. 10) and
at the end of [12], such a device will drift forward,
although perhaps very slowly, if driven strongly
enough to prevent infinite backward excursions.
Most discussions of the thermodynamics of informa-
tion processing, particularly in Brownian computers, ig-
nore hardware errors, i.e. transitions to states that are
neither on the intended computation path nor prede-
cessors of states on the intended path. Such transi-
tions, which in a genetic system would correspond to
mutations or copying errors, occur in any natural com-
puting apparatus but are ruled out by the infinite po-
tential energy barriers in idealized models such as the
clockwork computer of [5]. The theory of fault-tolerant
computation, which has recently received a great deal
of study in the context of quantum computing, aims to
show how, through appropriate design and software, ar-
bitrarily large reliable computations can be performed
on imperfect hardware suffering some fixed rate of hard-
ware errors. A full understanding of the thermodynam-
ics of information processing ought therefore to include
an understanding of the thermodynamics of error cor-
rection in a fault tolerant setting, a subject that appears
to be in its infancy. A tractable toy example of fault
tolerance, namely a Brownian copying system patterned
on the proofreading enzymes involved in DNA replica-
tion, was studied in [18], and its dissipation/error trade-
off analyzed. A related problem arises with liquid state
NMR quantum computation: although one can make the
gates fairly reliable, only reversible gates are available
and the initial thermal state is almost perfectly random.
Schulman and Vazirani [19] have devised an algorithm
for pumping the nonrandomness in a large number of
thermal qubits into a few of them, leaving the rest per-
fectly random. Much work remains to be done on the
dissipation/error tradeoff in more general settings.
Landauer’s principle in the context of other ideas in
19’th and 20’th century physics
Earman and Norton have pointed out with some jus-
tice that Landauer’s principle appears both unnecessary
and insufficient as an exorcism Maxwell’s demon, be-
cause if the Demon is a thermodynamic system already
governed by the Second Law, no further supposition
about information and entropy is needed to save the
Second Law. On the other hand, if the Demon is not
assumed to obey the Second Law, no supposition about
the entropy cost of information processing can save the
Second Law from the Demon.
I would nevertheless argue that Landauer’s princi-
ple serves an important pedagogic purpose of helping
students avoid a misconception that many people have
fallen into during the 20’th century, including giants like
von Neumann, Gabor, and Brillouin and even, perhaps,
Szilard∗. This is the informal belief that there is an
intrinsic cost of order kT for every elementary act of
information processing, e.g. the acquisition of informa-
tion by measurement, or the copying of information from
one storage medium into another, or the execution of a
logic operation by a computer, regardless of the act’s
∗Szilard’s classic 1929 paper [15] is tantalizingly ambiguous
in this respect. While most of the paper seems to attribute an
irreducible thermodynamic cost to information acquisition—
and this indeed is how his paper has usually been subse-
quently interpreted—the detailed mathematical analysis at
the end (paragraphs preceding his eq. 21) shows the entropy
increase as occurring during the resetting step, in accordance
with Landauer’s principle. Probably Szilard thought it less
important to associate the entropy increase with a particular
stage of the cycle than to show that it must occur somewhere
during the cycle.
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logical reversibility or irreversibility. In particular, the
great success of the quantum theory of radiation in the
early 20’th century led Gabor and Brillouin to seek an
exorcism of the Demon based on a presumed cost of in-
formation acquisition, which in turn they attributed to
the energy cost of a thermal photon, or in the case of Ga-
bor’s high-compression Szilard engine [16], to the cost of
recreating a static radiation field localized to one end of
a long cylinder, into which the molecule would wander
to trigger the power stroke. Landauer’s principle, while
perhaps obvious in retrospect, makes it clear that in-
formation processing and acquisition have no intrinsic,
irreducible thermodynamic cost, whereas the seemingly
humble act of information destruction does have a cost,
exactly sufficient to save the Second Law from the De-
mon. Thus measurement and copying can be intrinsi-
cally irreversible, but only when they are conducted in
such a way as to overwrite previous information.
The Second Law, uniquely among physical principles,
is and probably always will be in need of explanations
and worked-out examples showing why microscopically
reversible physical systems cannot escape it. When first
told of the Demon, any normally curious person will be
dissatisfied with the explanation “It can’t work because
that would violate the Second Law” and will want to see
exactly why it can’t work. That is the virtue of worked-
out examples such as Feynman’s ratchet and pawl. In-
deed Feynman’s ratchet and pawl argument provides a
more fundamental and elegant refutation of Gabor’s en-
gine than that given by Gabor, one that does not de-
pend on the quantum theory of radiation. Gabor’s en-
gine ( [16], his fig. 7) uses an optically triggered mech-
anism to trap the molecule at one end of a long cylin-
der. Once the molecule has been trapped, it is made to
do a large amount, kBT lnX of work by isothermal ex-
pansion, where X is the expansion ratio, hopefully more
than enough to replace the energy E dissipated when the
trap was sprung. But no trapping mechanism, optical or
otherwise, can be completely irreversible. As Feynman
points out in his analysis of the fall of the pawl off the
edge of a ratchet tooth, which is designed to prevent the
ratchet from rotating backwards, a trapping mechanism
that dissipates energy E at temperature T has a prob-
ability exp(−E/kBT ) of running backward. The cyclic
operation of Gabor’s engine is mathematically equiva-
lent to a ratchet machine which dissipates the trapping
energy E when the pawl falls, and does kBT lnX work
as the ratchet rotates in the intended forward direction
to the next tooth. If E > kBT lnX , Gabor’s engine
will run in the intended forward direction, but will not
do enough work to replace the energy lost in springing
the trap. If E < kBT lnX , the engine will run back-
wards of its intended direction, alternately compressing
the molecule and letting it escape into the long cylinder
through backward operation of the trap, and again it
will not violate the second law.
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